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NOTES

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF LABOR ARBITRATION
AWARDS AFTER THE TRILOGY
In the landmark Steelworkers Trilogy of 1960,1 the Supreme Court
announced a decisive policy favoring arbitration as a means of settling
labor disputes. 2 The Court determined that arbitration constitutes a
"major factor in achieving industrial peace," '3 which should not be undermined by judicial interference. In submitting their problem to arbitration, the parties rely upon the personal judgment of an arbitrator
who is endowed with an expertise judges lack. 4 A dispute is deemed
arbitrable unless the contract specifically excludes it from arbitration, 5
and once an arbitrator has made his award the judiciary must normally
refrain from overruling his judgment. 6
1 United Steelworkers v. Enterprisc Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
2 The Court had previously held, in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353
U.S. 448 (1957), that a provision for arbitration in a collective bargaining agreement could
be enforced under Labor Management Relations Act § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964). Federal
labor law controls whether the suit is commenced in the state or federal courts. Local 174,
Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962); see Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney,
368 U.S. 502 (1962).
3 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960).
4 The labor arbitrator is usually chosen because of the parties' confidence in his
knowledge of the common law of the shop and their trust in his personal judgment to bring to bear considerations which are not expressed in the contract as
criteria for judgment. . . . The ablest judge cannot be expected to bring the
same experience and competence to bear upon the determination of a grievance,
because he cannot be similarly informed.
Id. at 582.
5 Apart from matters that the parties specifically exclude, all of the questions on
which the parties disagree must ... come within the scope of the grievance and
arbitration provisions of the collective agreement ...

An order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied
unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not
susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should
be resolved in favor of coverage.
Id. at 581-83 (emphasis added).
6 The refusal of courts to review the merits of an arbitration award is the
proper approach to arbitration under collective bargaining agreements. The federal policy of settling labor disputes by arbitration would be undermined if courts
had the final say on the merits of the awards.
United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960).

, REVIEW OF ARBITRATION AWARDS

An arbitrator's power is not, however, unlimited. The Court recognized that, since the arbitrator's adjudicative authority stems from
the agreement of the parties to submit their disputes to arbitration, his
power is limited to interpreting and applying the bargaining agreement. Thus, while setting down the general rule of judicial nonintervention in the arbitration process, the Court issued the following caveat
in the last of the three cases, United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel
7
& Car Corp.:

[A]n arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of
the collective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense his
own brand of industrial justice. He may of course look for guidance
from many sources, yet his award is legitimate only so long as it
draws its essence from the collective bargainingagreement. When
the arbitrator's words manifest an infidelity to this obligation,
courts have no choice but to refuse enforcement of the award.8

Because of the Court's broad view of collective bargaining agreements,
it is difficult to determine the practical implications of the statement
that the award is enforceable only insofar as it "draws its essence from
the . . . agreement." The Court conceives of such an agreement as

"more than a contract; it is a generalized code" 9 which extends far
beyond the words the parties actually write into their contract. The
arbitrator is expected to interpret the contract in light of the "common
law of the shop which implements and furnishes the context of the
agreement."' 10
12
Since the Trilogy, some courts," and at least one commentator,
have suggested that the presumption in favor of arbitrability is justifi7 363 U.S. 593 (1960). This case, the last of the Trilogy, actually concerned the enforcement of an award. The first two cases dealt with the union's demand for specific
performance of the agreement to arbitrate.
8 Id. at 597 (emphasis added).
9 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960).
10 Id. at 580, quoting Cox, Reflections upon Labor Arbitration, 72 Hagv. L. Rv.
1482, 1499 (1959).
11 To compel arbitration in the first instance is not to approve carte blanche in
advance any decision which might be reached. The arbitrator is not a free agent
dispensing his own brand of industrial justice. And if the award is arbitrary,
capricious or not adequately grounded in the basic collective bargaining contract,
it will not be enforced by the courts.
International Ass'n of Machinists Local 2003 v. Hayes Corp., 296 F.2d 238, 242-43 (5th
Cir. 1961) (emphasis in original); accord, Carey v. General Elec. Co., 315 F.2d 499, 508
(2d Cir. 1963).
12 P. HAYS, LABOR ARBITRATON: A DISSENTING Vsaw 80 (1966): "No great harm is
done by applying a liberal rule as to arbitrability, if the court carefully scrutinizes what
the arbitrator later decides." The author points out the distinction betveen these two
problems by stating that there is no doubt that "the arbitrator has jurisdiction to be
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able only if there is meaningful judicial review of the arbitrator's
award. Several circuits of the United States Court of Appeals have expressly reserved the right to review and vacate an award in certain situations.' 3 The Enterprise Wheel caveat has provided the courts with a
means of avoiding the thrust of the Trilogy by allowing them to strike
down awards on the ground that they do not draw their "essence" from
the contract. Although the lower courts are bound by the Trilogy, their
willingness at times to indulge in a review of the merits indicates some
dissatisfaction with the Supreme Court's decisions. This Note will investigate the problems faced by the courts in the post-Trilogy era, and
attempt to pinpoint the reasons for the refusal of some courts to implement fully the policy of those cases.
I
PROBLEMS IN JUDICIAL INTERVENTION

When an arbitrator decides issues other than those submitted by
the parties, 14 or when his decision requires one party to violate a federal or state statute,15 the award will not be enforced. Closer questions
arise when the losing party asserts that the award is not supported by
the contract, 16 is contrary to an express limitation on the arbitrator's
authority,'17 or is contrary to some public policy.' 8
wrong. The question is whether he has authority to decide issues contrary to the provisions of the contract." Id. at 82 (emphasis in original); see Cox, supra note 10, at 1517.
13 Torrington Co. v. Metal Prods. Workers Local 1645, 362 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1966);
H. K. Porter Co. v. United Saw Workers, 333 F.2d 596 (3d Cir. 1964); Truck Drivers Local
784 v. Ulry-Talbert Co., 330 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1964); International Ass'n of Machinists
Local 2003 v. Hayes Corp., 296 F.2d 238, 242-43 (5th Cir. 1961); Textile Workers Local
1386 v. American Thread Co., 291 F.2d 894 (4th Cir. 1961).
14 Kansas City Luggage Workers Local 66 v. Neevel Luggage Mfg. Co., 325 F.2d 992
(8th Cir. 1964); Local 791, IUE v. Magnavox Co., 286 F.2d 465 (6th Cir. 1961); see International Ass'n of Machinists Local 1038 v. Jeffrey Galion Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 512 (6th Cir.
1965).
15 Glendale Mfg. Co. v. Local 520, ILGWU, 283 F.2d 986 (4th Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
366 U.S. 950 (1961) (award forcing employer to bargain with decertified union in violation
of National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1964)); Carpenters v.
Ebanisteria Quintana, 56 L.R.R.M. 2391 (D.P.R. 1964) (award requiring employer to
check off dues which had been timely revoked in accordance with Labor Management
Relations Act § 302(c)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(4) (1964)). But cf. Sportswear Workers Local
246 v. Evans Mfg. Co., 206 F. Supp. 572 (E.D. Pa. 1962), abf'd on other grounds, 318 F.2d
528 (3d Cir. 1963), although the essence of the court's holding seems to be that the party
seeking to upset the award had not shown that enforcement would actually require illegal
acts. However, an award based on a misinterpretation of law, as opposed to one actually
requiring a violation of law, may be without the scope of judicial review. Ficek v.
Southern Pac. Co., 338 F.2d 655, 657 (9th Cir. 1964); Newark Stereotypers' Union v. Newark
Morning Ledger Co., 261 F. Supp. 832, 836 (D.N.J. 1966).
16 See pp. 139-41 & notes 19-33 infra.
17 See pp. 142-45 & notes 34-47 infra.
18 See pp. 145-47 & notes 48-60 infra.
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A. Awards Lacking ContractualSupport
In the Trilogy the Supreme Court said that a collective bargaining
agreement "is more than a contract; it is a generalized code to govern
a myriad of cases which the draftsmen cannot wholly anticipate."' 9
Since the Court thereby incorporated by inference a "common law of
the shop which implements and furnishes the context of the agreement," 20 the arbitrator must look to the past practices of the parties as
well as to the words of the contract in reaching a decision.21 In this
light, it is difficult to apply the Court's limitation on the arbitrator's
power. The party seeking to enforce the award may argue, on the basis
of the Trilogy, that if anything in the words of the contract or the
"common law of the shop" supports the award, then it draws its "essence" from the contract and must be enforced. The party seeking. to
upset the award must assert that nothing in the contract or the past
practices of the parties supports it. Such an assertion invites courts to
violate the policy of the Trilogy by indulging in a wholesale review of
the "merits" of the case 2 2 -namely, is the union (or management) entitled to the awarded relief under the agreement?
The dispute in H. K. Porter Co. v. United Saw Workers23 involved
pensions to be paid employees as the result of a relocation of the company's plant. Although the contract provided that pensions would be
paid only to retiring employees who reached sixty-five with at least
twenty-five years of continuous service, in actual practice pensions had
often been paid to individuals with records of long service who did
not comply with the age requirement. Relying upon this custom, the
arbitrator awarded full pension rights to employees who had not
reached age sixty-five but had served for twenty-five years. He also
awarded some pension benefits to employees who had reached age sixtyfive but had not amassed twenty-five years of service. The court recognized that the arbitrator may use past practice to supplement the words
of the contract. But since only the first part of the award was actually
19 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960).

Id. at 580, quoting Cox, supra note 10, at 1499.
The ways in which an arbitrator may use the parties' past practices in interpreting
the agreement have been classified as follows: (1) to clarify ambiguous language in the
contract; (2) to implement the contract's general language; (3) to modify or amend apparently unambiguous language; or (4) to establish a separate enforceable condition of
employment. Mittenthal, Past Practice and the Administration of Collective Bargaining
Agreements, 59 Micff. L. RFv. 1017, 1022-40 (1961).
- 22 See note 6 supra.
20

21

23

53

F.2d 596 (3d"Cir. 1964).
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supportable on these grounds, the part based solely on age was va-

cated.

24

In Torrington Co. v. Metal Products Workers Local 1645,25 the
union demanded that management grant the employees time off with
pay to vote on election day. The company had granted this benefit of
its own accord for twenty years until December 1962, but announced
discontinuance of the policy at that time. Although the issue was discussed by the parties during 1964 contract negotiations, the benefit was
not included in the final agreement. When the company refused to
grant the benefit in 1964, the union filed a grievance and the parties
proceeded to arbitration. The arbitrator found for the union on the
basis of the past practice of the parties. 26 The court refused to enforce
the award, since the voting benefit was not included in the contract
and the history of the parties' practice with relation to it had ended
with its termination in 1962.
Although the opinions in both cases are couched in terms of the
arbitrator's lack of authority under the contract to find as he did, both
cases in fact run contrary to the basic ruling of the Trilogy that the
courts must not review the "merits" of the case.2 7 In each instance the
actual rationale for the result seems to have been that the arbitrator
28
clearly misapplied the evidence and came to the "wrong" conclusion.
24 The court's commentary on its disposition of the arbitrator's findings is illuminating:
[I]n Part 2 of the award the Arbitrator had no ground upon which to base his
interpretation of the clear and unambiguous words of the eligibility clause.
Standing by itself, it gave him no room to construe it in any manner [other]
than according to its plain meaning. Bereft of any practice evidencing a relaxation of the requirement of years of total service and relying only upon age, the
Arbitrator was unjustified in deviating from the plain mandate of the eligibility
clause, as it concerned those who fulfilled only the portion making the age of
sixty-five a requirement. Indeed, such an interpretation neither goes to the
essence nor to the application of the collective bargaining agreement.
Id. at 602.
25 362 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1966).
26 The actual award was as follows:
Employees who took time off to vote on November 3, 1964 shall be paid up to a
maximum of one hour and all other employees who worked during the election
hours on that Election Day and who were paid this benefit on November 6, 1962
shall be paid for the same amount of time off for Election Day 1964 as they
received for Election Day 1962.
The Torrington Co., 45 Lab. Arb. 353, 357 (1965).
27 See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960),
quoted in note 6 supra.
28 This was pointed out by a dissenting judge in Torrington. Torrington Co. v.
Metal Prods. Workers Local 1645, 862 F.2d 677, 684 (2d Cir. 1966) (Feinberg, J., dissenting). More recently, the court in Dallas Typographical Uniot v. A. H. Belo Corp., 372
F.2d 577, 583 (5th Cir. 1967), said of the Torrington result:
Couched as it is in terms of whether the bargaining agreement "'authorizes the
arbitrator to expand its express terms on the basis of the parties' prior practice"
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In Porter, the management's previous conduct indicated its willingness
to deviate from the letter of the eligibility clause for employees with
the required length of service, but not for employees without such required service.2 9 In Torrington,the court felt that the prevailing intent
of the parties to the contract was that the benefit be excluded, since
they had discussed the issue but omitted it from the contract. In short,
although the result in each case seems reasonable, the courts clearly
indulged in a full review of the merits. 30
The Supreme Court has posed an insoluble dilemma for the lower
courts. If they are to give force to the statement in Enterprise Wheel
that the "award is legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from
the collective bargaining agreement," 31 they must undertake a de facto
review of the merits of the case whenever one party claims the award
itself has no basis in the contract.3 28 Since judicial review in certain circumstances has been endorsed by the Supreme Court, and since at least
limited review is necessary to avoid subjecting the parties, against their
intentions, to clearly unsupportable awards, the best approach seems to
be that taken in Porterand Torrington. When the arbitrator bases his
judgment on the past practices of the parties, the only method of ascertaining whether the award has its "essence" in the contract is to (1)
review those practices, and (2) vacate the award if it is not supported
by them. There is little doubt that an award can be vacated if it violates the language of the written agreement. Since the "common law of
the shop" is a part of the contract,3 3 it seems equally reasonable for a
court to vacate an award which is not supported by the parties' established customs.
(emphasis added), 362 F.2d at 680, we think it has to be very carefully confined
lest, under the guise of the arbitrator not having "authority" to arrive at his
ill-founded conclusions of law or fact, or both, the reviewing-enforcing court
takes over the arbitrator's function.
29 The case itself illustrates that a court's decision whether to permit an arbitrator
to avoid clear language in the contract depends upon whether the custom is found to
justify the deviation.
30 The Porter court has some claim to innocence. Although a review of the merits
was undertaken, a strong argument could be made that there was no evidence on which
the arbitrator could base that portion of his award which was ultimately reversed. The
argument does not apply in Torrington, where the contested voting benefit had been
granted for 20 years previously, albeit the company had revoked its practice and the
union had failed in its efforts to reinstate it by negotiation.
al United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960),
quoted at p. 137 supra.
32 Chief Judge Lumbard, writing the opinion in Torrington, referred to this dilemma,

noting that some might say the court was undertaking an impermissible review of the
"merits" of the case. 362 F.2d at 680 n.6.
3 See p. 139 & notes 19-20 supra.
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B. Express Limitation on Arbitrator'sPower

When an arbitrator has violated an express limitation on his authority, the courts should refuse to enforce the award. The parties
clearly have the power to exclude specific matters from arbitration; 3
obviously they do not expect the arbitrator to ignore such limitations
or to "interpret" them out of existence. Since the arbitrator's power
derives basically from the agreement between the parties, his jurisdiction is clearly limited to those matters which the parties have agreed
to submit to arbitration.3 5 Judicial intervention where the ground for
upsetting the award is that the arbitrator exceeded a specific limitation
on his power is more palatable than where a court asserts a general
lack of contractual support for the award; 6 in the former case the court
can avoid the appearance of reviewing the merits of the case by focusing on the words of the contract.
The proper scope of judicial intervention is not, however, clearly
settled. Two leading authorities in the field have pointed out:
[Certain] types of ostensible contractual restrictions upon the jurisdiction of the arbitrator are simply different ways of structuring
the labor agreement in an attempt to preclude a finding that there
is a contractual commitment of the kind which must be found to
exist in order to sustain the grievance. Thus analyzed, the underlying question really involves
the merits and should be relegated
to the arbitration process.31
Furthermore, "it could be argued that the question of arbitrability is
simply one of interpretation of part of the arbitration clause, and
hence, like any other question of interpretation arising under the labor
agreement, should be disposed of by judicial abstinence

....

,38 The

Apart from matters that the parties specifically exclude, all of the questions
on which the parties disagree must come within the scope of the grievance and
arbitration provisions of the collective agreement.
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581 (1960) (emphasis added).
35 See Sinclair v. Atkinson Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238, 241-43 (1962).
36 See pp. 139-41 & notes 19-33 supra.
37 Smith & Jones, The Supreme Court and Labor Dispute Arbitration: The Emerging Federal Law, 63 MicH. L. Ray. 751, 793 (1965). As to whether the problem was intended for the arbitrator, the authors state:
The critical question is whether these kinds of contractual attempts to restrict
the arbitrator's jurisdiction should be equated with cases where the parties by
agreement have specifically excluded certain subject matters from the arbitration
process or instead should be treated like those cases where the claim of nonarbitrability rests on the proposition that the labor agreement contains no express or implied substantive commitment of the kind which must be found in
order to sustain the grievance.
Id. at 792-93.
38 Id. at 789. The authors add that "in some cases the intent and scope of the exclu34
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result may well depend on how specifically the limitation is worded;39
the more general the restriction, the more forceful the contention that
the arbitrator should be relied on to render the proper interpretation.
In two discipline-discharge cases arising after the Trilogy, for example,
each court vacated the arbitrator's award on the ground that he had
exceeded his power. In one case the limitation was specific;4 0 in the
other it was ambiguous. 4 1 That the decision in the latter evoked a
lengthy dissent indicates that the question was at least a closer one than
42
in the former.
sionary language arguably may call for the kind of expertise which, in the 1960 Trilogy
cases, the Court attributed to the arbitrator." Id. at 790.
S9 See id. at 788-93, comparing provisions which specifically exclude from arbitration
the subject matter of a particular grievance with general contractual restrictions on the
arbitrator's jurisdiction. For clear authority that a general restriction will not exclude a
specific matter from arbitration, see United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363
U.S. 574, 581 (1960), quoted in note 34 supra.
40 Truck Drivers Local 784 v. Ulry-Talbert Co., 330 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1964). The
contract specified that, in cases involving discipline or discharge:
[T]he arbitration board shall not substitute its judgment for that of the management and shall only reverse the action or decision of the management if it finds
that the Company's complaint against the employee is not supported by the facts,
and that the management has acted arbitrarily and in bad faith or in violation
of the express terms of this Agreement.
Id. at 564. An employee was discharged for falsifying his records as to work hours. After
finding that the employee was indeed guilty of the offense charged, the arbitrator found
that discharge was an excessive penalty and ordered the employee reinstated, despite the
clear language of the agreement. Because he had exceeded the mandate given by the parties, the court vacated the arbitrator's award.
41 Textile Workers Local 1386 v. American Thread Co., 291 F.2d 894 (4th Cir. 1961).
This case involved substantially the same fact situation as Ulry-Talbert, except that the
disputed clause reserved to the company:
the right of management [which] . . . includes, among other things, the right
. . . to discipline or discharge employees for just cause. . . . Any action by the
Company under this Section may be made the subject of collective bargaining
grievance procedure, up to but not including arbitration. ...
Id. at 897 (emphasis by the court; other emphasis by the court omitted). As in UlryTalbert, the arbitrator found the employee guilty of the offense charged (for which he
had been warned twice prior to the final incident), but then ordered the employee reinstated. The arbitrator interpreted the boiler-plate language italicized above to mean
that he was "not foreclosed from inquiring in this case whether just cause for discharge,
rather than for a lesser disciplinary measure, existed." Id. at 899. The court of appeals
refused enforcement of the award, saying this interpretation did "violence to the dear,
plain, exact and unambiguous terms of the submission and the contract of the contending
parties." Id.
42 Chief Judge Sobeloff dissented. His argument was that the clause quoted above
involved the dual sanctions of discipline and discharge without defining "just cause" for
either. Thus, management's right could arguably become absolute only after a determination that there was just cause to discharge, rather than merely to discipline, the employee.
Since the arbitrator had interpreted the contract in this way, his judgment should not be
overruled. Id. at 901-06 (dissenting opinion). This exemplifies the problem referred to by
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The decision in Enterprise Wheel may have some bearing on the
problem. That case involved arbitration of an employee discharge
grievance after the collective bargaining agreement expired. The arbitrator rejected the contention that the expiration of the agreement limited his authority, 43 and awarded reinstatement of the workers with

back pay. The court of appeals held that the award should not include
damages for the period subsequent to the expiration of the agreement. 44 The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the full award
should be enforced. The limit imposed by the date of the contract in
Enterprise Wheel seems analogous to express limits on the arbitrator's
authority. If the case were carried to the extreme, it would leave the
arbitrator free to decide the scope of his own authority, provided only
that some interpretation of the contract supports his finding.
No court has adopted this reasoning. Whether an arbitrator has
the power to make an award is necessarily a function of whether the
dispute was arbitrable in the first place, and the courts clearly have the
power to reject decisions of issues made nonarbitrable by the contract. 45
It is logical that the judiciary should have the last word in the case of
an express and specific limitation, since the arbitrator is not likely to
have any expertise about such a question to which a court should
defer. 46 An arbitrator should not be permitted to piggyback a power to
Smith & Jones, pp. 142-43 & note 37 supra; though the provision appears merely to define
the matters that are arbitrable, its effect is to provide a substantive definition of the
rights of management.
43 United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 595 (1960).
In such a situation, the question again arises whether the time of the contract is a limit
on the arbitrator's authority (which he may not exceed) or on the parties' substantive
rights under the contract (which an arbitrator has plenary power to decide by "interpreting" the length of the period for which the contract extends). See pp. 142-43 & notes 37, 42
supra. The 1960 Court apparently took the latter approach.
44 United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 269 F.2d 327, 331 (4th Cir.
1959), rev'd, 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
45 [W]hether or not the company was bound to arbitrate, as well as what issues
it must arbitrate, is a matter to be determined by the Court on the basis of the
contract entered into by the parties.
Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238, 241 (1962) (emphasis added); accord, John
Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 547 (1964); Retail Clerks Ass'n v. Lion Dry
Goods, Inc., 341 F.2d 715, 720-21 (6th Cir. 1965).
46 Whether the arbitrator is indeed possessed of all the expertise attributed to him
by the 1960 Supreme Court is another question. See p. 148 & note 65 infra. Where the
arbitrator does not twist the meaning of the clause limiting his power or ignore it altogether, but rather finds that the fact situation involved is not within that class of cases
the limitation clause has excepted from the arbitration process, a court may be more likely
to accept the arbitrator's decision that the contract does not preclude him from hearing
the case. See Marble Prods. Co. v. Local 155, United Stone Workers, 335 F.2d 468 (5th Cir.
1964).
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decide the scope of his own authority onto his plenary power to decide
the merits.4

7

The judiciary's watchdog function is therefore justified in

these cases.
C. Awards Contrary to Public Policy
Even if the award does not exceed the arbitrator's authority under
the contract, the court may refuse to enforce it on the ground that it
contravenes public policy. It is clear that an award which requires an
employer to violate a federal or state statute will not be enforced. 48
Whether an award can be vacated when it offends some less specific
"public policy" is not so clear.
The rationale of the cases that have struck down arbitration
awards on public policy grounds is that the public, which is not a party
to arbitration proceedings, has an interest in the case that the courts
may not overlook. 49 Courts have, however, enforced awards even though
some public policy was violated. In Local 453, JUE v. Otis Elevator
Co.,50 involving the discharge of an employee following a criminal conviction for gambling on company premises, the Second Circuit asserted
that:
It is no less true in suits brought under § 301 to enforce arbitration awards than in other lawsuits that the "power of the federal
courts to enforce the terms of private agreements is at all times
47 See p. 137 & notes 11-12 supra. Of course, the parties may explicitly give the
arbitrator this power. However,
[W]here the assertion by the claimant is that the parties excluded from court
determination not merely the decision of the merits of the grievance but also the
question of its arbitrability, vesting power to make both decisions in the arbitrator, the claimant must bear the burden of a dear demonstration of that purpose.
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 583 n.7 (1960).
48 See cases cited note 15 supra.
49 In one case the arbitrator had granted reinstatement of an employee discharged
for gambling on company premises in violation of both a state penal statute and company rules. The court vacated the award, stating:
Arbitrators may not take unto themselves, whether or not by assent of the
"T]he laws in support
parties, authority to act against the public interest ....
of a general public policy and in enforcement of public morality cannot be set
aside by arbitration."
Avco Corp. v. Preteska, 22 Conn. Supp. 475, 480, 174 A.2d 684, 687 (Super. Ct. 1961).
The same result was reached by the New York Court of Appeals in a case involving
discharge of telegraph employees who refused to transmit messages to or receive messages
from companies being struck by a member union. Western Union Tel. Co. v. American
Communications Ass'n, 299 N.Y. 177, 86 N.E.2d 162 (1949). The arbitrator ordered reinstatement with back pay after finding that refusal to handle "struck traffic" was customary
in the industry. The court refused to enforce the award, because the acts violated the
state penal law, and enforcement would give "judicial sanction . . . to such [illegal]
conduct." Id. at 186, 86 N.E2d at 167.
50 314 F.2d 25 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 949 (1963).
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exercised subject to the restrictions and limitations of the public
policy of the United States." 51
In the particular circumstances, however, the court enforced the arbitrator's award reinstating the employee. Thus, courts retain the weapon
of judicial review when public policy is outraged; but because of the
competing policy of the Trilogy favoring finality of awards, they will
probably use the weapon sparingly.
Cases involving the discharge of employees found to have subversive political views are analogous to those involving criminal convictions. In the leading case of Black v. Cutter Laboratories,5 2 the discharged employee was a member of the Communist Party and had
submitted false information on his job application. The arbitration
board found that the real reason for the discharge was the employee's
union activity and ordered reinstatement with back pay. The Supreme
Court of California refused to enforce the award, saying:
[A]n arbitration award which directs that a member of the Communist Party who is dedicated to that party's program of "sabotage,
force, violence and the like" be reinstated to employment in a
plant which produces antibiotics used by both the military and
civilians is against public policy . . . and will not be enforced by
53
the courts.
If Black were before the court today, the result might well be different.
The "Red fever" of the McCarthy era has abated, and a vague anticommunist policy would have to be balanced against the Trilogy's clear
policy favoring the finality of arbitration awards. Indeed, in a similar
case decided after the Trilogy, one court reached a result opposite from
54
that of Black.
Where an arbitration award contravenes a rule of law which is
based on public policy, the reviewing courts have also gone both ways.
In New York, for example, one court vacated an award of punitive
damages for breach of contract on the ground that public policy precluded such damages. 55 The New York Court of Appeals, on the other
51 Id. at 29, quoting Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 34-35 (1948).
52 43 Cal. 2d 788, 278 P.2d 905 (1955), cert. dismissed, 351 U.S. 292 (1956).
53 Id. at 798-99, 278 P.2d at 911.
54 WPIX, Inc. v. Broadcast Eng'rs Local 1212, 52 L.R.R.M. 2321 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962).
An arbitrator had found that the employee had severed connections with the Communist
Party at least 10 years before the discharge and was no longer a security risk; the court
thus felt there was no "public policy" reason for refusing to enforce the award.
55 Publishers' Ass'n v. Newspaper Deliverers' Union, 280 App. Div. 500, 114 N.Y.S.2d
401 (1st Dep't 1952). Another award was treated as contrary to public policy in Western
Union Tel. Co. v. American Communications Ass'n, 299 N.Y. 177, 86 N.E.2d 162 (1949).
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hand, enforced an award granting specific enforcement of an employment contract, 6 a remedy usually denied as a matter of policy.
Either result may be rationalized in terms of policy. On the one
hand, the courts, as guardians of the public interest, should not permit
the arbitration process to shield results which are contrary to legitimate
public policy. On the other hand, courts should not ignore the policy
favoring arbitration as a method of promoting industrial peace. 57 The
Black case illustrates the problem; both the majority" and the dissenters5 9 invoked public policy in support of their views. 60
The Trilogy's clear policy favoring finality of arbitration should
be subordinated to a conflicting "public policy" only where the latter
is stronger and clearer than the former. Where the arbitrator has not
exceeded his authority under the contract, there is little justification
for judicial intervention. Because the parties' expectations have been
fulfilled, the award should not be overturned unless it flagrantly violates
the public interest.
II
RETROSPECT-WHITHER THE TRILOGY?

At the core of the Steelworkers Trilogy is the perception that
arbitration is a "substitute for industrial strife"'" and "a major factor
in achieving industrial peace." 62 Though few would challenge the
proposition that industrial peace is more desirable than industrial
56 Staklinski v. Pyramid Elec. Co., 6 N.Y.2d 159, 160 N.E.2d 78, 188 N.Y.S.2d 541
(1959). Although the majority asserted that "there is no controlling public policy," Judge
Burke pointed out in his dissent that the award in fact offended established principles of
public policy. Id. at 164, 160 N.E.2d at 80, 188 N.Y.S.2d at 543. See also Ruppert v.
Egelhofer, 3 N.Y.2d 576, 148 N.E.2d 129, 170 N.Y.S.2d 785 (1958) (enforcing the arbitrator's
grant of an injunction which the court itself would have been forbidden by statute to
decree).
57 United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960). To ignore that
policy would be to frustrate the presumed intent of the parties. See pp. 149-50 & notes 70-71
infra.
58 See p. 146 supra.
59 "[The majority decision] defeats the public policy in favor of employee organization
free of employer interference and coercion . . . and the public policy in favor of the
43 Cal. 2d at 812-13, 278 P.2d at 920 (Traysettlement of disputes by arbitration .
nor, J., dissenting).
60 The elusiveness of the concept was noted by Chief Justice Story:
Public policy is in its nature so uncertain and fluctuating, varying with the habits
and fashions of the day, with the growth of commerce and the usages of trade,
that it is difficult to determine its limits with any degree of exactness.
Quoted in Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Champlin, 11 Okla. 184, 187-88, 65 P. 836, 837
(1901).
61 United Steelworkers v. Warrior ?c Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960).
62
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strife,6 s some courts appear to have doubts about the assumptions underlying the Supreme Court's view of arbitration. Despite the policy of
the Trilogy, several courts have reserved the right to review arbitration
awards in certain circumstances. 64 That the right has been exercised in
many close cases indicates that courts have used the caveat of Enterprise
Wheel to evade the rule of the Trilogy.
Doubt has been expressed that the arbitrator is quite as sage
as Supreme Court cast him. Judge Hays argues persuasively that he is
not.
An arbitrator is a third party called in to determine a controversy
over whether one of the parties to the collective bargaining agreement has violated that agreement. He is not a wise counsellor and
statesman whom the management or the union looks to for advice
on how to run their affairs or how to increase production or lessen
tensions. He is merely an ad hoc judge to whom is submitted the
question of whether the collective bargaining agreement has been
violated. The chances are very good that, in all but a tiny percentage of arbitrations, this is the first time he has had anything to do
with the plant, and that he knows nothing of the background of
the dispute or of the "common law" of the industry. In fact there
is a considerable possibility that this is his first arbitration case.
He has no expertise in these matters and is not expected to have
any ....65

This view suggests that the average judge is probably as competent as
the average arbitrator to assess the parties' intent in light of the common law of the shop. Indeed, Judge Hays further states:
A proportion of arbitration awards . . . are decided not on the

basis of the evidence or of the contract or other proper considerations, but in a way which in the arbitrator's opinion makes it
likely that he will be hired for other arbitration cases. 66
If this analysis is correct, justice requires not that the courts stay out
of the arbitration process, but rather that they keep a close eye on arbitrators to ensure that they fulfill their appointed role.
63 It has been argued, however, that arbitration is not a true "substitute for industrial strife," since strikes and lockouts are nearly always prohibited during the term of the
contract anyway and the threat of pecuniary damages deters such activity. Rubenstein,
Some Thoughts on Labor Arbitration, 49 MARQ. L. REv. 695, 701 (1966).
64 See cases cited notes 11, 13 supra.
65 P. HAYS, supra note 12, at 111. Judge (formerly Professor) Hays is a veteran of
many years in the arbitration field. A related line of attack centers on the alleged tendency
of many arbitrators to bypass the rules of evidence in the conduct of the hearing, which
leads to the inclusion of much irrelevant evidence in the proceeding. See Jones & Smith,
Management and Labor Appraisals and Criticisms of the Arbitration Process: A Report
with Comments, 62 Mxcst. L. REv. 1115, 1127-32-(1964).
66 Id. at 112.

REVIEW OF ARBITRATION AWARDS

The Supreme Court assumed that the parties to an agreement
expect the arbitrator to consider not only the words of the contract
but also the common law of the shop and the effect of his decision upon
productivity, shop morale, and tensions between labor and management. 6 The assumption may not be valid. Judge Hays has stated:
One of the difficulties with these views of the nature of arbitration and the collective agreement is that both are still matters of
contract. They still are in actualfact what the parties want them to
be, whatever [the Court] . . . may think they ought to be. In each

of these cases, it must be remembered that one of the parties was
there screaming to high Heaven that what he intended bore no
resemblance whatever to the thing that [the Court] . ..has described. . .. [A]s a practical matter, arbitration and the collective
agreement are what [the Court] . . . says they are if, and only if,

the labor unions want them to be that way, which is certainly
doubtful as a general proposition, and they can at the same time
induce, or force, the employer to agree. 68
One veteran arbitrator forthrightly admits his doubt that parties
want arbitrators to exercise the wide-ranging authority granted by the
Trilogy: "[M]ost employers and unions. . . do not want arbitrators to
function in the 'philosopher king' manner suggested by the Court's
statement." 69
The Trilogy's final conclusion of law, which is based on further
assumptions concerning the intent of the parties, is also questionable.
The Court reasoned:
It is the arbitrator'sconstruction which was bargained for; and so

far as the arbitrator's decision concerns construction of the contract,
the courts have no business overruling him because their interpretation of the contract is different from his.70
67 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960). See
p. 137 & notes 9-10 supra.
68 Hays, The Supreme Court and Labor Law: October Term, 1959, 60 COLUM. L.
REv. 901, 924 (1960) (some emphasis added; other emphasis in original). The immense
practical power of an arbitrator has been noted:
[L]abor arbitration may not always be a dispute settlement technique that relies
solely on pre-existing standards and norms found in a collective bargaining agreement and in the common law of an enterprise.... This may mean that the
arbitrator will give less than full attention to the terms of the agreement or the
common law of an enterprise.
Wellington, Judicial Review of the Promise to Arbitrate, 37 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 471, 482 (1962).
Professor Wellington adds that "this may be what the parties expect when they choose
their arbitrator. But how can a court tell on review?" Id. He concludes that the best
policy would be for the courts to emphasize the limitation on the arbitrator's authority
set out in Enterprise Wheel. Id. at 484.
60 Davey, The Supreme Court and Arbitration: The Musings of an Arbitrator, 36
No=ax DAME LAWYER 138, 140 (1961).
"t0 United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960)
(emphasis in original).
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There is no way to know exactly what parties have in mind when they
contract, but it is doubtful that they usually "bargain for" the arbitrator's judgment. They actually have no real choice when they agree
to the arbitration clause. The alternative to arbitration may be a long
and costly strike which neither party wants. The fact that collective
bargaining agreements almost always contain provisions for arbitration 71 indicates that parties rarely consider not including it. The real
reason for an arbitration agreement is practical necessity, not implicit
faith in the arbitrator's wisdom. Even if the contracting parties "bargain for" the arbitrator's ruling, they probably do not mean to accept
any interpretation which he might produce. A more natural assumption
is that parties who agree to arbitration do so with the expectation that
72
the award will be based on a reasonable interpretation of the contract.
Courts of appeals that have vacated awards may agree with the
Supreme Court that arbitration is a valuable tool generally. But by
emphasizing the Enterprise Wheel limits on the arbitrator's power
rather than the central Trilogy rule of judicial nonintervention, they
have adhered to a realistic view of the parties' intent and have granted
the just protection of meaningful review.
Clarke W. Brinckerhoff
71 Some 94% of all collective bargaining agreements contain labor arbitration clauses.
Jay, Arbitration and the Federal Common Law of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 37
N.Y.U.L. Rav. 448, 452 n.18 (1962).
72 Rubenstein, supra note 63, at 705. The author says that the parties who agree to
arbitration do so "upon the assumption that arbitrators who render opinions under their
agreement will do so not only impartially, but also with some degree of competence and
in a way that can be reasonably anticipated." Judge Hays's experience, at least, indicates
that the arbitrator may be neither impartial, competent, nor reasonable. See p. 148 &
notes 65-66 supra.

